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10 September 1960

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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Berlin: Ulbricht's speech of 8 September is designed to define East German as well as Soviet policies toward West Berlin by spelling out the limitations of Khrushchev's commitment to maintain the status quo until "next spring." He warned that this should not be interpreted to mean that the West had been given a free hand to stage "provocations" and implied that further measures against West German ties to West Berlin would be taken. Ulbricht also proposed that the US consider a phased disarmament plan for Germany, including conclusion of a peace treaty at the end of the first phase in 1961. In another effort to assert the regime's claims to sovereignty, he proposed that East German representatives be permitted to address the UN General Assembly meeting. [REDACTED]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Iran: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Shah is "in a very depressed mood" over Iran's military situation and is convinced that further participation in CENTO is useless. He may decide to withdraw from CENTO and fall back entirely on the Iranian-US bilateral pact. Although the Shah's unhappiness at the level of American aid and CENTO's inactivity is chronic, it might be sufficiently intensified at this time by continuing Soviet pressure, the election crisis, and the consequent upsurge in opposition political activity to convince him that Iran should withdraw from CENTO. [REDACTED]

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DAILY BRIEF

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France-Mali: France plans to recognize Senegal as an independent country on 11 September and thereafter to propose its admission to the UN, even though Paris anticipates that such formal acknowledgment of the breakup of the Mali Federation will create difficulties both in Africa and in the UN. As far as Soudan is concerned, France believes its recognition of Mali covers that country and plans no special action. The Soudanese members of the Mali Government, who have proclaimed Bamako the capital of the federation as well as of Soudan, appear determined to implement their threat to break off relations with any nation recognizing Senegal's independence and have already moved to terminate some French activities in Soudan. In addition, special representatives have been sent to New York to push the Soudanese position at the UN, and another Mali envoy was scheduled to depart for Moscow on 9 September.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Ulbricht Unveils East German Plan for Berlin and Germany

In presenting to the Council of Ministers his regime's memorandum to the United Nations concerning German disarmament, East German party boss Ulbricht on 8 September undertook to define East German policy toward Berlin and Germany. He warned that Khrushchev's pledge--made after the breakup of the summit meeting in May--not to carry out before next spring unilateral measures concerning Berlin, such as the signature of a separate peace treaty with East Germany, does not mean that West German and West Berlin elements are permitted to "aggravate the anomalous situation in West Berlin." He intimated that East Germany will take further measures to weaken West German ties with West Berlin. Ulbricht's speech was published following the regime's announcement that restrictions, apparently permanent, are being placed on the entry of West Germans to East Berlin.

The proposal for a phased disarmament of Germany--evidently intended to back up Khrushchev's over-all proposals at the UN--is designed to present the Ulbricht regime in a posture of reasonableness and perhaps to provide further justification for a possible future move to sign a separate East German - Soviet treaty. The main new point in the current East German proposals, which sum up various past plans, is the provision for signature of a peace treaty with the "two German states" and transformation of West Berlin into a demilitarized free city at the expiration of the first phase in 1961.

Ulbricht also revealed that his regime is addressing a letter to Secretary General Hammarskjold requesting permission for East German representatives to present their views at the UN General Assembly. This request is intended to enhance East German claims to sovereignty and equality with West Germany--which, although not a member of the UN, maintains a permanent observer delegation in New York.

Ulbricht returned from his six-week vacation in the USSR highly satisfied

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with his discussions with Khrushchev, [REDACTED]

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The recent East German measures to tie East Berlin more closely to East Germany, by giving the sector border the character of an international frontier in defiance of four-power agreements guaranteeing freedom of movement in the city, probably are motivated in part by the regime's desire to take additional steps to stem the refugee flow to West Berlin. Despite the sharply intensified security measures imposed last week end, more than 3,000 East Germans and East Berliners escaped to the Western sectors of Berlin in the week ending 6 September. More than 126,000 East Germans have fled to West Germany and West Berlin so far this year, including almost 21,000 in August. [REDACTED]

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Shah Considering Withdrawing Iran From CENTO

The Shah, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is considering withdrawing Iran from the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and relying on the bilateral defense agreement with the United States for military security.

The Shah, who again is in a depressed mood regarding the level of US military aid and domestic budget problems, is said to believe that Iran's participation in CENTO is leading the country into greater military expenditures than it can afford. He is discouraged over Turkey's exclusive reliance on NATO for its defense and over lack of progress toward a CENTO command structure, of which he hoped to become commander in chief.

The Shah is also reported disturbed by what he regards as the lack of coordination between CENTO and the American military mission in Iran. He believes this to be a further indication that the United States considers CENTO of no importance. Hedayat claims that if Iran attends the CENTO Ministerial Council meeting in Ankara in February, it will probably be for the last time.

The Shah for years has had periods of discouragement with what he regards as the lack of material and moral support from his allies. At present, however, he is in the middle of a crisis over election scandals and faces the problem of how to hold new elections that give the appearance of being free but are sufficiently controlled to assure an obedient parliament. Domestic opposition elements, realizing his vulnerability, are taking full advantage.

At the same time, the USSR is continuing to offer economic aid in exchange for a written guarantee that no foreign bases will be permitted on Iranian soil. Withdrawal from CENTO would lighten Iran's financial burden and lessen the pressure on the Shah from both the Soviet Union and neutralist-inclined politicians within Iran. [REDACTED]

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